that to announce it now would invite attack on the grounds that it is an unjustifiably narrow interpretation of the basis on which compensation should be paid. I am sure it would pay to be less specific.

I am a little worried about what you propose to say on frontiers. I fully agree that you must avoid the appearance of weighting your words in favour of the Arabs, and with that in mind I can see why you wish to retain "in all respects" in the first paragraph.

But I fear that the first and last sentences of the second paragraph as it stands will give the Arabs the impression that you think a few minor adjustments to the frontier are all that will be necessary and that you are expecting them to enter into direct negotiations with the Israelis on that basis. The Prime Minister shares my apprehension. I also fear that this will drive them into open opposition and in particular spoil our chances with the Egyptians, who will think that you have ignored their desire for access across the Negev. I must therefore ask you to reconsider this paragraph. Could you not perhaps omit the first sentence and simply say at the end that in spite of the difficulties of conflicting claims and sentiment you believe that it is possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests of all the parties, adding that the United States would be willing to help in the search for a solution if required. 150

Yours sincerely.

Harold Macmillan 5

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1

Washington, August 20, 1955-3:46 p.m.

324. We informally advised by IBRD that both engineering and economic reports on High Aswan Dam now prepared for management consideration early date with recommendations GOE be invited

⁵Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.7432Z/8-2055. Confidential. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London and Khartoum, and pouched to Addis Ababa and Nairobi.